INTRODUCTION:

It is important to understand the variegated ways in which migration and displacement are perceived, if we are to analyse it. It is equally important to note the reasons that propel migration from a particular environment, or the ‘home’ environment; and the creation and augmentation of the feeling of displacement in the ‘new’ environment, i.e., the place where one has moved to. This paper argues that there is a dire need for development in the NER, which is one of the most pertinent causes for out-migration from the region. In consonance with this, there is a prerequisite for recognizing Northeast India and its unique ethnicities, where peace and development have been usurped by conflict and violence. The external new environment must understand such underpinnings, complex as they are, upon which out-migration from the Northeast is based. It must stop looking at the migrant population of the region as strange bedfellows of the so called ‘mainstream’ population.

Kallio notes five key drivers of migration. They are: a) environmental (food security, climate change, disasters); b) political (discrimination, conflict, insecurity); c) demographic (population density, structure); d) economic (employment opportunities); and e) social (family and kinship)¹. Intervening factors such as costs of moving, social networks, political and legal frameworks, and personal factors such as age, sex, religion, education, marital status, ethnicity etc. determine the final decision. These complex factors play out in multiple ways.

The Migration Problem in the Northeast :

The Northeast is a conundrum of cartographic boundaries; birthed from a post-colonial regime that has little or no familiarity with the ethos of the region. The multitude of ethnicities that characterize the northeast must be considered, before lumping them merely as people of a certain race. Ethnic strife, armed conflict, and consequent displacements continue to mar its peace process. The porousness of its international borders also adds to the problem. A fragile ecology giving away to the quest for development worsens it further. Hence, the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the NER are huge. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2006) reported that in 2001, approximately 1,57,000 persons were displaced in the various states of the NER². The reported numbers of IDPs as of 2011 is more than 76,000 in the region (IDMC, 2011). Of 69,000 South Asians that were displaced in 2023, 67,000 were from Manipur, owing to the ethnic carnage that erupted, and still simmering. The region remains obscure; except on sporadic issues such as bringing laurels to the country during sporting events. Besides instances like the recent Meitei-Kuki conflict that erupted in May 2023, mainstream media coverage of the NER is very rare, insufficient, and tardy.

In the backdrop of modernisation and liberalisation, unemployment has risen as development has not kept pace in the NER. Violent ethnicity and identity-based conflicts induce people to migrate. Almost all the insurgency movements in northeast India can be attributed to their disgruntlements with the region’s backwardness and the vulnerability of the porous borders. For instance, the rate of growth of voters in immigrant areas surpassed that of the rate of actual population growth in Tripura³. Lack of infrastructure, connectivity, and power supply, continue to gnaw the development efforts. This induces capital flight and brain drain too, thus eating away developmental efforts.

There are three major attributes to migration: a) the original inhabitation (push factors); b) the destination of migration (pull factors); and c) personal factors (crucial deciding factors)⁴. This paper will address the major issues of education, employment, marriage, ethnicity, disturbance of civil life, and lack of economic development. Mistri points out that there were two per cent interstate migrants in the NER in both the 2001 and 2011 censuses. He also reiterates that indigenous people hesitate to leave their homelands for livelihood, except in extreme circumstances. Migrations to the mainland were mostly for employment and education. 13 per cent migrated for ‘other’ reasons, such as seeking to avoid or escape conflict, political unrest, and natural calamities. This ‘other’ is a very pertinent reason for migration in the NER⁵.

A quick glance at the migration figures of the NER depicting both male and female, and comparing with the All-India figures of Census 2011 will help us proceed further. The Census of India has seven categories as reasons for migration: work/employment, business, education, marriage, moved after birth, moved with household, and others. In 2001, ‘natural calamities’ as a reason for migration was replaced with ‘moved at birth’.

The Census collects migration information on two aspects— by ‘place of birth’ (POB) and ‘place of last residence’ (POLR). A person would be considered a migrant by POLR if her/his last residence is different from her/his place of enumeration. It is vital to note from Table no.1 below that migration for ‘others’ from the NER is very high as compared to all India figures while marriage as a reason is near insignificant. Meanwhile, Mistri has done a three decadal analysis and notes that it was 13.5 per cent, 15.2 per cent, and 13 per cent in 1991, 2001, and 2011 respectively. ‘Others’ include all hazards ranging from riots, conflicts, and any kind of civic unrest, to which the NER is no stranger⁵. In the case of natural disasters, usually people return to the original place within a short time frame, as has been exemplified by various studies. Migration due to ‘other’ reasons have a different story to tell. In terms of time, migration can be intercensal (0-9 years), or lifetime (any individual whose place of residence at the time of decadal census is different from that at the time of birth/ enumeration). In terms of space, it can be interstate (within or outside the NER) or out of the country. This paper looks at interstate migration, both within and outside the NER, with a special focus on out-migration to the mainland.

Table No 1: Out-Migration as a Percentage of Total Migration

*Reasons*	*Gender*	*NER*	*All India*
Work/ Employment	Male	37.95	23.96
Work/ Employment	Female	6.20	2.07
Business	Male	5.72	1.84
Business	Female	0.75	0.29
Education	Male	5.26	2.26
Education	Female	2.74	0.70
Marriage	Male	2.49	44.84
Marriage	Female	3.66	66.48
Moved after Birth	Male	2.20	1.43
Moved after Birth	Female	13.74	4.45
Moved with Household	Male	25.48	29.83
Moved with Household	Female	20.31	11.72
Others	Male	20.9	14.22
Others	Female	34. 24	14.30

Source: Census 2011

Education and Migration:

The UNFPA notes that in recent history, global socio-political, economic, and demographic variations have resulted in huge levels of migration. Some do it for lucrative employment options. Some others migrate to escape the violent situations, disasters, and poverty⁶. It also highlights that education and employment have been the main impetus towards migration today. The World Youth Report underlines the significance of education as paramount towards enhancing the life chances and opportunities of young people⁷.

Levy and Walter analyse the complex and commensurate interrelationship between education and migration. Both the push and pull factors intersect as the educated youth continue to look for opportunities in the urban metros⁸. Day and Paul also add that the scramble for higher education continues. Further migration often takes place for occupational advancement⁹. Education undoubtedly enhances a person’s life chances. To understand why this outflow continues unabated, the educational growth scenario in the NER is presented briefly below.

Out-Migration and Education:

The UGC reports that as on March 31, 2017, the NER had 10 central universities, 13 state universities, 31 private universities, 1 deemed university and 924 colleges¹⁰. Shimray and Usha Devi thus noted that education as a driver for out-migration is reducing, owing to improvements in the educational landscape in the NER. However, the phenomenon is quite complex⁴. One attribute could be undoubtedly due to some improvements in higher educational institutes in the NER. The other more significant aspect is the data source population and the data itself. Mere literacy without achieving quality higher education is inadequate in the increasingly competitive and globalized world. Underequipped to face these requirements, the youth become prone to frustration and aggression. Hence, the thrust should be not only on literacy drives and school education. There must be equal focus on higher education, technical education, and vocational education too, with adequate stress on quality. Except for the urban areas in the NER, even basic primary and secondary education lie in shambles in the face of appalling infrastructure such as lack of classrooms, furniture, and teacher as well as student absenteeism.

In such a scenario, it is a natural consequence that a large exodus of young people, especially the student population out-migrate. The number of migrant students from NER rose from 18,000 in 1981 to 26,000 in 1991; 30,000 in 2001 to 40,000 in 2011¹¹. Mistri presents interstate out-migration for education data both within and outside the NER, based upon the last three censuses. In 1991, lifetime migrants were 4 per cent, while intercensal were 6.1 per cent. In 2001, it was 2.7 per cent and 5.8 per cent; in 2011, it was 3.9 per cent and 6.9 per cent respectively⁵.

Studies on out-migration particularly for education from the NER has not been well explored. All along, studies have been focussed upon in-migration around the partition era, and how it has changed the socio-political fabric of the NER. However, in recent times, out-migration is becoming more disturbingly visible. The Census reported more out-migration from Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, and Assam. It also reports the out-migration figures from the region as a little over one million¹¹. Mistri reports 7.0 per cent student migrants in 2001, which rose to 9.0 per cent in 2011 to the mainland. Manipur was at the top with 37.3 per cent in 2001, and 29 per cent in 2011. Under the current grim scenario in Manipur, the figures would be certainly very high⁵.

Employment and Migration Trends:

Today, the NER is gripped by rising unemployment and underemployment of educated youth. The initial migration decision is for education. The subsequent quandary would be whether to return ‘home’ upon completion or persist in the ‘new’ environment, thus being categorised as lifetime migrants.

NSSO data showed net migration rates in 2007-2008 in Arunachal Pradesh as (-20), Assam (-5), Manipur (-30), Meghalaya (-7), Mizoram (-1) and Nagaland (-5). However, the states of Sikkim and Tripura showed (+16) and (+17) respectively. The overall net figures showed (-4). This indicated how the push factors acted strongly in the NER¹². The Census also shows an increasing trend of urbanization, where the urban population as a percentage of the total population increased from 27.8 in 2001, to 31.2 in 2011¹¹. While analysing such rapid urban growth rates, the outflow of people from the NER cannot be neglected.

Census 2011 indicates that outflows of migrants from the NER comprised of 20.9 per cent to the North, 45.3 to the East, 11.4 to the West, 13.4 to the South, and 9 per cent to Central India¹³. The distribution of NE migrants across India spread over various states. It was 39.56 in West Bengal, 7.66 in Delhi, 7.4 in Maharashtra, 7.04 in Karnataka, 6.61 in U.P., 3.27 in Bihar and Haryana each, 3.23 in Rajasthan, 2.86 in Gujarat, 2.81 in Punjab, and 16.29 in the other states¹¹. It can thus be observed that maximum migrants choose West Bengal as their destination, perhaps owing largely to proximity and lesser socio-cultural differences. Delhi as the leading destination has certainly changed. Western and Central India remain a less preferred choice.

Lusome and Bhagat also note that 52 per cent NER migrants hailed from urban areas, who in turn migrated to urban metros mostly. They report that 68 per cent out-migrate to urban destinations. One of their major findings was that most out-migrants came from Assam and Manipur, with the latter being higher¹³. Manipur remains most disturbed compared to the other Northeast states as is evident in the current scenario.

Singh and Gandhiok report a changing trend in migration destination. There is a decline in Delhi as the preferred destination¹⁴. Meanwhile others report a rise in inflow to Kerala¹⁵. Deori¹⁶, Kiruthiga and Magesh¹⁷ and, Baite and Xavier¹⁸ report increasing inflows to Chennai while Marchang¹⁹ reports similar trends in Bangalore. Lusome and Bhagat¹³ highlight that this new trend of South India as a preferred destination could be attributed to the pace of industrialization in the region, better wages and a less racist society as compared to the rest of India barring the eastern region. This is noteworthy.

The need to migrate is examined in the context of maximising individual satisfaction via better employment opportunities and a sense of security. Faggian and McCann underline that a major goal of migration is to maximise one’s welfare²⁰. Indian migration has a basic element of chain migration, wherein earlier migrants induce or facilitate later prospective migrants to establish themselves in the new environment via information, guidance, and various other social and even financial support. The link continues as natives in the far away homelands observe that these migrants can seek gainful employment and provide remittances back home, provide valuable information about life and other opportunities in the migration destinations, thus helping prospective migrants¹⁹.

Mistri highlights that 30 per cent of migrants from the NER to the mainland cited work/ employment as the reason in the 2011 census. It was 17 per cent in 2001. He also adds that the rural unemployment rate in the NER has doubled in every decade since 1993–1994. In 2017–2018, it was 7.9 per cent; and the urban–rural difference was around 3.0 per cent in the same year⁵. Post-liberalisation of the Indian economy, the unemployment rate in the NER has surpassed the Indian average, and the gaps have started widening even further in the 2000s and 2010s, which is alarming.

Marriage, Migration and Women:

Census 2011 notes that in 2009, there were 28 million migrant employees in the organized sector. It was 27.7 million in 2001. What must be highlighted is that migrant women employees rose from 17.8 in 2001 to 19.9 per cent in 2009. This dimension also needs to be looked at while analysing marriage, migration, and women. Absorption in jobs in the new environment entails marriage and settling with household; which perhaps explains the increased numbers of women migrants. But caution must be exercised before assuming that most women migrants are attributed to marriage. A decadal analysis (1991 -2001) of the census shows that marriage and other family related migration was 72.2 per cent of all migration. During 2001-2011 it rose to 74.7, within which marriage as a reason amongst the family related reasons, is decreasing²¹. Mistri⁵ computes marriage related migration based upon the last 3 censuses. In 1991, lifetime migrants were 26.2 per cent, while intercensal was 20.3 per cent; rose to 35.9 per cent and 25.3 per cent respectively in 2001; and reduced to 24.6 per cent and 19 per cent respectively in 2011.

Poor Economic Development:

Research has proven that regions with higher levels of economic development produce fewer forced migrants. People are less likely to flee from their homes if economic opportunities are available. Thus, beyond violence, there are also important socio-economic factors that affect peoples' decisions to migrate or not. Migration and resultant displacement are significantly reduced in industrialised places, owing to employment opportunities. In the absence of industrialisation and economic growth, the problem of unemployment faced by the educated youth in the northeast is paramount. Migration acts as an indicator of the socio-economic and political development and stability of a region. A peaceful environment is a precursor to economic development⁵.

No singular reason can justify the rapid growth of some economies in contrast with others. The complexities of social systems and huge variations within and amongst them must be considered. Economies go through three transformational stages that re-structure them significantly as they grow. They are the commercial, industrial, and knowledge-based stages, where economies can get ensnared at each or any of these stages. The knowledge economies lunge forward owing to scientific advancements. A chronological occurrence of these stages is not essential. Some may leapfrog while some may bear several characteristics of different stages at a time ²². The NER is such a variegated mix, almost bereft of industrialisation and development. Disturbance of civil life and lack of economic development essentially go hand in hand. Besides, education, employment, civil disturbance, and economic development are all interrelated. It is the pursuit for quality education and gainful employment which only a peaceful and developed society can provide; that pushes people to migrate from the NER.

Migration as A Panacea:

The NER has been fraught with a fragmented history which complicates the migration question even more. The 2011 census reported 2.24 per cent of the northeast population as lifetime inter-state out-migrants. In 2001, it was 2.86 per cent and in 1991, it was 2.04 per cent. Intercensal migrants in 1991 was 0.92 per cent, 1.18 per cent in 2001, and 1.03 per cent in 2011⁵.

Kikon and Karlsson highlight that post Indian independence, violence, mistrust, armed conflict, and extra judicial killings have underlined the NER. Ethnic groups view each other as rival groups and peace has remained elusive, and deprived of development too. In 1997, the Indian government ushered in a spate of development programmes as well as skill-enhancement workshops, aimed at creating employment and development of the region. They cite a 2017 study by the North East Support Centre and Helpline, a Delhi-based organization, which reports that the outmigration from the region has increased 12 times in the last five years prior to the report; and over 5 million people from Northeast India are likely to become migrants in the subsequent five years. This study highlighted that around 66 per cent migrate for education but barely 5 per cent return to their native places. The remaining 34 per cent out-migrate for employment. Of these migrant youths, majority of them are absorbed in the hospitality sector, such as beauty salons, spas, hotels, retail shops, and restaurants²³. Preferred as these indigenous migrants are by their employers, they continue to lead their lives as inferior citizens in a world that is brazenly different from their known native lands. The migration of the indigenous natives of the NER, who would have ideally clung on to their land, is increasingly becoming a trend. Those who stay behind wistfully wonder what will happen to their ancestries and their land. Such a trend of indigenous migration is being noted globally, and in 2018, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues observed the International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples on this topic. This day is celebrated on August 9, every year. Another very noteworthy feature is the role of the church and other indigenous social networks such as students’ groups, that help the new migrant navigate through the alien terrains of these mega cities. They further inform us that, unbelievable as it sounds, many parents sometimes do not even come to claim the bodies and merely send money to the community members to perform the last rites as they simply cannot wade through the alien landscapes.

Under these circumstances, one can imagine the plight of these indigenous migrants. They are torn by the lure of these mega cities and the life it can offer them with a simultaneous burst of nostalgia of a faraway home that has been left behind; where perhaps many of them know that they will never step back again. This is what characterises many of the NER migrants.

Ethnicity, Identity, and Insurgency:

Identity politics are dominant in this fragile and porous region where militant activities engulf ethno-politics. A huge power divide in the NER, both inter and intra ethnic groups propel uprisings. Connectivity with India is through what is commonly referred to as ‘the chicken’s neck’; and alienation overrides governance. Independent India brought joy to the vast nation but the woes of the NER multiplied manifold. Inequality and deprivation continue to fuel aggressive uprisings.

Upadhyaynotes that under the Government of India Act 1935, hill areas in NER are still considered as ‘excluded areas’, not viable for governance²⁴. These thwart the process of integration of the tribal communities. Consequently, they remained immune to national integration. Thus, major parts of the NER continue to retain their characteristic feeling of alienation. Scholars perceive this as a springboard for a multitude of ethnicity and secessionist movements which plague the region. Dasgupta and Dey report that understanding conflict-borne migration and displacement in the NER necessitates understanding the historical background of the region’s cartographies²⁵. Lopita Nath argues that undocumented immigration to the NER where it has been forced to accommodate both legal and illegal immigrants from the adjoining nations of Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar has added to the region’s woes²⁶. Goswami further adds that the problem is compounded by cartographic overlaps of much coveted homelands; wherein such pre-colonial geographies are irrelevant today²⁷. However, ethnic dilemmas persist and clashes continue.

Conflict and Development Induced Displacement:

Ongoing conflicts and violence have continued to fuel out-migration. Adhikari had identified factors such as violence, economic development, geography, and social networks induced migration²⁸. The developed economies with higher GNP per capita have lesser refugees^29,30. This underlines the significance of economic opportunities. The NER, being bereft of such opportunities, continue to out-migrate.

Nongkynrih meanwhile through his study on educated youth from Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, concluded that huge numbers of graduates were still unemployed. Anxiety, frustration, and depression have even led to substance abuse, where some have succumbed to it. Village elders have also expressed the imminent threat of food shortage. The young and educated population, even if they have not migrated out, are not inclined towards traditional work such as farming and allied activities. They seek government or private sector jobs, commensurate to their qualifications and expectations³¹.

Ethnicity, The Outsider, and Extremism:

The history of the NER entails that identity politics and migration are so intertwined. There was unparalleled influx of migrants in the post partition era from Bangladesh and Nepal as well as from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The ‘son of the soil’ issue became very prominent. In Tripura, the indigenous tribal population almost became a landless minority against the migrant Bengalis. The indigenous people became the socially excluded, resulting in severe identity crises; as they draw synergies from their soil, their culture, and their land. Besides that, key government jobs were being occupied by non-tribals thus inducing further feelings of exclusion, which gave way to militancy³².

Ethnicity is not the overarching cause of conflict in the NER. Politics and economics get interspersed with it and act as very strong drivers of conflict among various ethnic groups. Most ethnic movements were initially peaceful but later morphed into violence in the post-colonial era³³. Bijukumar further reaffirms that the state’s use of force further antagonises ethnic groups and they resort to extremism³⁴.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

No single factor can be attributed to migration. Neither can the push and pull factors be examined in isolation. It has been observed that relative deprivation instigates the migration process. The word relative is significant as the comparison is always with destination places reflecting a comparatively better environment than the home environment. Migration from the NER is typical, as the quest for better education and employment specifically in the organised sector are the main stimuli, which also explains the relatively better off migrating out.

Article 19(1) of the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and reside and settle in any part of the territory of India. Nonetheless, the reasons for exodus must be examined. Any element of latent force must be analysed. For instance, the scale of migration from the NER for education is disturbing. The overall character and pattern of NE-migrants are also quite different from that of all-India. Most of the censuses do not reflect it adequately. Majority of them are from urban areas of the NER; belong to relatively better-off families; and seek better education to upgrade their quality of life. Those who come for employment also typically do not venture into menial jobs such as construction work. Rather, they join the organised sector. Majority of the young migrants join the hotel industry, retail chain, or boutiques, spas etc.

Out-migrating to work in spas and restaurants are probably not the most promising career options. Hence active steps must be taken to induce thrust to economic growth in the NER. It will arrest conflict situations, create ample job opportunities, provide competitive institutions of higher learning; consequently, reducing flight to the mainland. No doubt in this globalised borderless era, migration is commonplace. But, the inducement to return home would exist in a peaceful and developed region. One positive step could be to harness its rich hydroelectric potential and mineral resources, without harming its ecology. Studies on migration in the region have been mostly on trans-border migration and the refugee problem of the NER. Many scholars are however now analysing northeast out-migration; but remain at a small scale. If larger government institutions take up such studies, a critical understanding of this phenomenon can be obtained.

A report submitted by the Working Group on Migration ²¹ under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation highlighted that India does not define migrants in a standard way. The two major government agencies, namely the Census and the National Sample Survey, rely on different criteria for migration data. The Census defines a migrant as an individual who has changed his place of residence in the past six months from one village/town to another village/town. Birth place is also noted. Meanwhile, NSSO captures migration based on last usual place of residence and current place of residence. Thus Census 2001 recorded 30 per cent migrants in the country while NSS recorded only 28 per cent of the total population in 2007-08.

Therefore, availability of authentic, timely, and reliable data is crucial to understand the phenomenon of migration. This includes not just the usual determinants but those critical to any country’s overall growth, such as access to healthcare, education, employment, housing conditions etc. Besides the Census and NSS data, those generated by both government and non-government actors, including independent researchers, must be examined holistically. The thrust on studies on in-migration from the international borders must be balanced with out-migration studies too. The NER must be looked at through a different lens as common characteristics that underline the typical all-India migrant are largely different from those of the NE-migrant. There is a need to stop labelling them as cheap ‘exotic’ migrant labour for the hospitality industry, while at the same time discriminating them based upon their race.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST:

The author have no conflicts of interest regarding this investigation.

REFERENCES:

1. Kallio E. Human Migration: Implications and Opportunities for Conservation. Vol 4.; 2016. Available on https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/pdf_final_human_migration.pdf.

2. Hussain M. North-east India’s forgotten IDPs. Forced Migr Rev. 2005; 24:68. Available on https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/sudan/hussain.pdf.

3. Madhab J. North-East: Crisis of Identity, Security and Underdevelopment. Econ Polit Wkly. 1999; 34(6): 320-322. Available on http://www.jstor.org/stable/4407622.

4. Shimray UA, Usha Devi MD. Trends and Patterns of Migration: Interface with Education- A Case of the North Eastern Region.; 2009. Available on http://www.isec.ac.in/Monograph 15.pdf?cv=1.

5. Mistri A. Migration from North-East India During 1991–2011: Unemployment and Ethnopolitical Issues. Indian Journal of Labour Economics. 2022; 65(2): 397-423. doi:10.1007/s41027-022-00379-5

6. UNFPA. State of the World Population 2006 Youth Supplement: Moving Young.; 2006. Available on https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/moving_young.pdf.

7. United Nations. World Youth Report 2003: The Global Situation of Young People.; 2003. Available on https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/worldyouthreport.pdf.

8. Levy MB, Wadycki WJ. Education and the Decision to Migrate: An Econometric Analysis of Migration in Venezuela. Econometrica. 1974;42(2):377. doi:10.2307/1911985

9. Day KH, Landis PH. Education and Distance of Migration of Youth. Elem Sch J. 1945; 46(4):200-208. doi:10.1086/458812

10. Taba P. Challenges and Prospects of Higher Education in Northeast India: A Comprehensive Analysis. International Journal of Novel Research and Development (IJNRD). 2023;8(9). Available on www.ijnrd.org.

11. Census. Migration Tables. Vol 1.; 2011. Available on https://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/migration.html

12. NSSO. Migration in India: 2007-2008 NSS 64th Round (June 2007-June 2008). Vol 533.; 2010. Available on http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/533_final.pdf.

13. Lusome R, Bhagat RB. Migration in Northeast India: Inflows, Outflows and Reverse Flows during Pandemic. Indian Journal of Labour Economics. 2020;63(4):1125-1141. doi:10.1007/s41027-020-00278-7

14. Singh P, Gandiok J. Fewer people from northeast and southern states making Delhi their home. Times of India. Published July 31, 2019. Available on https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/fewer-people-from-northeast-and-southern-states-making-delhi-their-home/articleshow/70458576.cms.

15. Arya S. Two Day National Seminar on Revisiting Strategies of Growth and Sustainable Development Domestic Migrant Workers in Kerala and their Socio-Economic Condition. Shanlax International Journal of Economics. 2018;6(S1):74-77. doi:10.5281/zenodo.1488521

16. Deori B. A case of single female labour migrants working in the low-end service jobs from North-Eastern region to the metropolitan city Chennai, India. IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS. 2016;21(6):20-25. doi:10.9790/0837-2112062025

17. Kiruthiga V, Magesh R. The Migration of North East People towards Chennai - A Case Study. International Journal of Management Research and Business Strategy. 2017;6(2):94-97.

18. Baite NSD, Xavier GG. Student Migrants in India: A Study on the North East Students in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. Int J Sci Res. 2020;9(4):35-39. doi:10.36106/ijsr

19. Marchang R. Migration from North-Eastern Region to Bangalore: Level and Trend Analysis.; 2016. Available on http://www.isec.ac.in/WP 371 - Marchang Remeingam_2.pdf.

20. Faggian A, McCann P. Human capital flows and regional knowledge assets: A simultaneous equation approach. Oxf Econ Pap. 2006;58(3):475-500. doi:10.1093/oep/gpl010

21. Government of India. Report of the Working Group on Migration.; 2017.

22. Sachs JD. Stages of Economic Development.; 2004. Available on https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8M332JS/download.

23. Kikon D, Karlsson BG. Leaving the Land: Indigenous Migration and Affective Labour in India. Cambridge University Press; 2019.

24. Upadhyay V. Globalization, Sub-Regional Co-operation and Development of North East India. Man & Development. 2005;27(3):37-50. Available on http://www.crrid.res.in/journal/?p=53.

25. Dasgupta G, Dey I. State of research on forced migration in the east and north-east. Econ Polit Wkly. 2010;45(21):37-42.

26. Nath L. Migrants in flight: conflict-induced internal displacement of nepalis in northeast india. Peace and Democracy in South Asia. 2005;1(1):57-72. Available on https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1325224.pdf.

27. Goswami U. Internal Displacement, Migration, and Policy in Northeastern India.; 2007. Available on https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/EWCWwp008.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=32180.

28. Adhikari P. Conflict-Induced Displacement, Understanding the Causes of Flight. Am J Pol Sci. 2013;57(1):82-89. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012. 00598.x

29. Schmeidl S. Exploring the causes of forced migration: A pooled time-series analysis, 1971-1990. Soc Sci Q. 1997;78(2):284-308.

30. Levin S, Fulginiti A, Moore B. The perceived effectiveness of online social work education: insights from a national survey of social work educators. Social Work Education. 2018;37(6):775-789. doi:10.1080/02615479.2018.1482864

31. Nongkynrih AK. Problems of the Youth of North-East India: A Sociological Inquiry. Sociol Bull. 2009;58(3):111-126. doi:10.1177/0038022920090304

32. Fernandes W. Limits of Law-and-Order Approach to the North-East. Econ Polit Wkly. 2004;39(42):4609-4611.

33. Wolf S. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford University Press; 2006.

34. Bijukumar V. Social Exclusion and Ethnicity in Northeast India. The NEHU Journal. 2013; XI(2):19-35. Available on https://www.nehu.ac.in/public/assets/files/journals/JournalJuly_DecArt2111213.pdf.

Received on 24.02.2025 Revised on 14.08.2025

Accepted on 24.11.2025 Published on 20.03.2026

Available online from March 23, 2026

Int. J. of Reviews and Res. in Social Sci. 2026; 14(1):15-22.

DOI: 10.52711/2454-2687.2026.00004

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. Creative Commons License.